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The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982 took effect July 1,1983. In a twopart article, the author discusses the background and the salient features
of the new code. The first part, printed here, deals with background,
general provisions, and crimes against the person. The second part, to be
published In the Spring Issue, will deal with crimes against property,
morals and family, public administration, and public peace, and with
sentencing.

GOODBYE 3-CARD MONTE:
THE WYOMING CRIMINAL
CODE OF 1982
Theodore E. Lauer*
Any person found dealing, playing or opening the game commonly known as "3-card monte" on any railroad or passenger train
in this state shall be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor, and when
convicted shall be punished by a fine not to exceed one hundred
dollars ($100.00), and imprisonment not less than ten (10) days nor
more than ninety (90) days, in the county jail. 1
I. THE LOSS OF THE FAMILIAR

Wyoming's 3-card monte statute, enacted by the Council and House of
Representatives of the Territory of Wyoming, was approved December 13,
1873.2 Passed, as 0. W. Holmes, Jr. would write some seven years later, in
*Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Wyoming College of Law. BA.,
1953, Millikin University; LL.B., 1956, Washington University; S.J.D., 1958, University
of Michigan.
Disclosure statement: The author must assume some of the responsibility for any shortcomings in the 1982 Wyoming Criminal Code, since participated in interim legislative
hearings in 1981 and 1982, and spoke before legislative committees in both houses of the
Wyoming Legislature in the 1982 and 1983 legisltive sessions, all dealing with the
Criminal Code. Shortcomings may therefore be attributed in some degree either to the
was being considered, or to bin inaility
author's failure to perceive them when thee
to persuade the legislative committees to adopt a different course when shortcomings
perceived.
were
to the former criminal statutes will
1. WYo. STAT. § 6-9-105 (1977). In this article, citations
be given as (1977), while those to the new Criminal Code will be given as (Supp. 1983).
2. 1876 Wyo. CoMp. LAWS ch. 58, pt. II, § 2.
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response to the "felt necessities of the time," s the statute would endure for
nearly 110 years, until July 1, 1983. By the time of its demise with the taking effect of the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, passenger train service
had vanished in Wyoming, and few living men recalled what 3-card monte
had been about.4 It is not known how many prosecutions ever took place
under the statute, but it is abundantly clear that the Wyoming Supreme
Court was never called upon to construe it.
3-card monte was not the only victim of the new Wyoming Criminal
Code. Many other statutes possessing a peculiarly "Wyoming" flavor
were7
6
also repealed: failure to remove headwear at public assemblies; dueling;
producing a false heir; s riot and rout;9 hazing;10 murder by duel; 1 poisoning
water supply;12 unlawful use of lodge emblems and misrepresentations as
to secret societies; 18 and advertising drug or nostrum for procuring abortion or miscarriage.14 All of these and more have been swept into oblivion
by the new Criminal Code.
The obsolescence of 3-card monte and other colorful criminal statutes
was in part responsible for the impulse which culminated in the Wyoming
Criminal Code of 1982. Other forces played a larger role. Beginning in the
early years of the twentieth century, scholars such as Dean Roscoe Pound
of Harvard Law School began to call urgent attention to the decay of
American criminal law, and reform through modern substantive criminal
legislation was seen as a partial solution.15 Much of the scholarly impetus
came from a desire to incorporate social science principles into the criminal
justice system. 16
In 1931 the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) proposed that a model
code of criminal law be drafted. Nothing was done, however, until the
3. 0. W.HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
4. Inquiry in summer 1983 among learned men and judges disclosed either that no one knew
what 3-card monte was, or that they were reluctant to say. Looking elsewhere for a clue,
it appears that while § 189 of the Canadian Code (Tremeear, 1983) even at this date forbids the playing of 3-card monte, the statutory definition is of little assistance:
(2) In this section "three-card monte" means the game commonly known as
three-card monte and includes any other game that is similar to it, whether or
not the game is played with cards and notwithstanding the number of cards or
other things that are used for the purpose of playing.
Dictionaries provide guidance to the extent of informing that "monte" is Spanish for
mountain, or scrub, or the cards remaining after a deal. While some dictionaries call
3-card monte a Mexican card game, others call it "a Mexican three-card trick." See, e.g.,
CHAMBERS TwENTirHm CENTURY DIcrIoNARY 852 (New ed. 1973).
5. Wvo. STAT. § 6-9-105 (1977) contains no annotations of judicial decisions; SHEPARD'S
WYOMING CITATOR is silent; and 3-card monte appears nowhere in Words and Phrases,8
WYOMING DIGEST (1956 & Supp. 1983).
6. Wyo. STAT. S 6-6-203 (1977).
7. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-6-301, 6-6-302 (1977).
8. WYO. STAT. § 6-8-402 (1977). This section, denuded of its identity, probably has been subsumed within § 6-3-407 of the new Criminal Code.
9. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-6-101, 6-6-102 (1977). What was formerly rout can now be prosecuted as
conspiracy. Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-303 (Supp. 1983).
10. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-4-608, 6-4-609 (1977).
11. WYO. STAT. § 6-4-105 (1977).
12. Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-603 (1977).
13. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-121, 6-3-122 (1977).
14. Wyo. STAT. § 6-5-302 (1977).
15. See, e.g., R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INAMEICA (1924), especially at 204-212.
16. See, e.g., Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARv. L. REV. 453 (1928).
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Rockefeller Foundation granted funds to the A.L.I. for this purpose in
1952.17 For the next ten years, work proceeded on the model code in a
determined fashion, aided by a large contingent of noted lawyers, judges
and academics, and in 1962 the Proposed Official Draft of the Model Penal
Code was published.18
The Model Penal Code (M.P.C.) had an immediate and far-reaching effect. Prior to 1952, only one American state had substantially revised its
criminal statutes in the twentieth century. Between 1952 when the
American Law Institute's intense work began to stimulate individual state
criminal law reform efforts, and 1981, thirty-four states revised their
criminal codes. Seven others had revision under way, and in six more revision had been proposed but defeated. Only in Nevada and Rhode Island had
no action taken place. 19
II. THE CONCEPT OF A CRIMINAL CODE
The concept is still relatively new to the common law world that all the
law relating to substantive crimes should be set forth in a comprehensive
code which includes not only the elements of crimes, but also definitions,
basic principles of liability such as mental state, defenses and other excusing conditions, and disposition of offenders. While we have long had collections of criminal statutes that have been called criminal codes, these
"codes" have largely been jumbled heaps of disparate statutes drawn from
common law crimes. Since statehood every American state has been compiling and recompiling its criminal statutes, but the resulting collections
have drawn heavily upon the uncodified and sometimes unwritten common
law for context and substance. The unifying thread of consistency is
absent.
The Model Penal Code exemplifies the notion of a comprehensive
criminal code. It is a cohesive body of consistent principles which permits
solution of most problems of substantive criminal law through application
of the principles which appear in the code. The terms used are defined
carefully, and the substantive provisions do not contradict or duplicate one
another.
The promulgation of a true criminal code represents a significant
departure from the past. The process of drafting the code involves a
thorough examination of the underlying principles of criminal responsibility. The adoption of a comprehensive code causes a significant shift of
power from the judiciary to the legislature, since much less occasion for interpretation or for fashioning new law will be left to the courts. Judicial opposition is not uncommon.
A great deal of time and money can be expended in the preparation of a
new criminal code. Sometimes the task will prove thankless and the effort
17. Wechsler, The Ch

ofa Model Penal Code, 65 HAav. L. REV. 1097 (1952). See also P.

Low, J. JEFFRIES, & . BONIE, CRiMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS Appendix A,
A-1 to A-5 (1982).

18. P. Low, et at., supra note 17, at A-1, A-2.
19. Id. at A-2 to A-4.
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wasted, as where the proposed code is heavily amended by the legislature
so as to destroy its internal consistency, or where the legislature rejects the
code in its entirety.
It has been suggested, at least half seriously, that a state like Wyoming
cannot easily afford the years of work and hundreds of thousands of dollars
of expense which are required to create a new code, and that the easiest
and most economical approach would be to adopt in totality the modern
criminal code of another jurisdiction. After all, if nearly three dozen
American states have revised their criminal codes in thoroughgoing
fashion in the past twenty years, then surely it would be an easy task to find
one of these codes which is suited to Wyoming's conditions. And while no
code will be completely free from flaws, the chances are good that the quality of product borrowed from another state would be equal to any code
which Wyoming is likely to produce.
This would not be a course without precedent in the American past.
Many Western states began their histories with statutes directly copied
from the laws of older and more eastern states. But today native pride
must be reckoned with. Wyoming now has a substantial history of its own,
and has its unique outlook based upon the conditions within the state and
the beliefs and sentiments of its own people. The laws of no other state, it
can be said with assurance, are adequate to the challenge that faces us.
Therefore, we must have our own criminal code, a Wyoming criminal code.
III.

CRIMINAL CODIFICATION IN WYOMING

Wyoming achieved statehood in 1890. The first session of the Wyoming
Legislature reenacted a number of Wyoming Territorial criminal statutes
and also adopted a large number of criminal statutes taken directly from
the Indiana Statutes.20 During the ensuing decades, many additional sections were enacted in piecemeal fashion. No substantial efforts toward revision or recodification occurred until the 1970s, when federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funding enabled the Wyoming Attorney
General to prepare a draft of a proposed new criminal code. This draft was
submitted in 1977 to the Joint Judiciary Interim Committee of the Wyoming Legislature, but was not favorably received. Instead, the legislative
committee determined to prepare its own revision.
From 1979 until 1981 a Criminal Code Subcommittee of the Joint
Judiciary Interim Committee worked upon a draft of a code, during which
time public hearings and subcommittee meetings were held and input from
lawyers, judges, legislators, and the general public was solicited. Although
the subcommittee recognized that its draft of a proposed Wyoming
criminal code was in rough and unfinished form, it introduced the proposal
in the 1982 session of the Wyoming Legislature. 21 The 1982 session was a
20. The history of Wyoming's codification effort is drawn from a September 17, 1981 communication from Representative Cynthia M. Lummis, chairman of the Criminal Code
Subcommittee of the Joint Judiciary Interim Committee, Wyoming Legislature, to
Wyoming judges, lawyers, and law enforcement personnel, and from the author's personal observations.
21. Senate File No. 63, 1982 Wyoming Legislature.
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short budget session, limited by the Wyoming Constitution and laws to
twenty legislative days. 22 In spite of predictions that the proposed code
would simply vanish from sight in the short legislative session, the
Legislature enacted the code with an effective date of July 1, 1983.28
Governor Herschler did not2 sign the act, but instead permitted it to become
law without his signature. '
In 1982, following the legislative session, the Criminal Code Subcommittee worked assiduously to prepare remedial amendments to the 1982
Wyoming Criminal Code. A large number of amendments were introduced
in the 1983 legislative session under the sponsorship of the Joint Judiciary
Interim Committee. 25 Many of the corrective amendments were adopted,
some were rejected, and a number of other amendments were made, some
of a maverick nature, during the 1983 legislative session.
What has been enacted is denominated the Wyoming Criminal Code of
1982. It is not truly a code, inasmuch as it lacks the internal cohesion and
unitary jurisprudential approach which a code must have. Whether it is an
improvement upon prior law remains to be seen, but will depend in significant measure upon the willingness of the Legislature to amend and revise
the code as shortcomings and inconsistencies appear.
The Criminal Code of 1982 is unique to Wyoming. It was forged from
the minds and labors of Wyoming citizens, legislators, judges, lawyers, and
law enforcement personnel. While it contains innovation, it also rests solidly upon the bedrock of the past. At the same time, it bears telling evidence
of its origins, and of the manner in which the legislative process works.
The influence of the Model Penal Code is clearly present. Although early drafts borrowed more heavily from the Model Penal Code, in the final
version prior Wyoming statutory language and conceptualism often won
out. But whole sections from the Model Penal Code remain, together with
words and phrases of Model Penal Code origin sprinkled throughout the
Wyoming Code. The M.P.C. influence is hardly surprising; it has been the
single greatest influence in American substantive criminal legislation in
the past half-century.
Wyoming's Criminal Code has also borrowed whole articles, but more
often sections or subsections of the Code, from the statutes of other states.
Thus the five statutory sections dealing with computer crimes26 were taken
from Florida,"7 as it was believed that existing Wyoming statutes provided
inadequate protection for this new area of property rights. New gambling
statutes 28 were drawn from Colorado,2 9 whose statutes had in turn been
based upon the Model Anti-Gambling Act. 30 Indiana influenced the sections
22. WYO. CoNST. art. 3, § 6; WYO. STAT. § 28-1-102(b) (1977).
23. 1982 WYo. Ssss. LAWS ch. 75, § 6.
24. 1982 Wyo. Sss. LAWS ch. 75.
25. Senate File No. 30, 1983 Wyoming Legislature.
26. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-501 to -503 (Supp. 1983).
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 85 (1964 & Supp. 1983).
28. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-7-101 to -103 (Supp. 1983).
29. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-10-102, 18-10-103 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
30. MODEL ANTI-GAMBLING AcT (1952).
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on prostitution.81 Statutes of other states influenced single sections of the
Wyoming code: breach of the peace 2 is derived from a Kansas statute, 8
and the burglar tool statute"4 came from Colorado. 6 Additionally, while
based largely upon preexisting Wyoming law, Chapter 5, Offenses Against
Public Administration, 6 was influenced by terminology used in the Colorado statutes.8 7 Overall, however, the criminal statutes of other states did
not have a major influence upon the 1982 Wyoming Criminal Code.
The main influence upon the 1982 Code came from prior Wyoming
statutes. Many have been retained without significant change, others have
been modified in small ways, and still others have been reworded or consolidated into single sections. The impetus for retention of the old came
from several disparate sources, which combined to limit sharply the
amount of true change that was incorporated into the new Code. A first
source was the rationale which underlies the oft-expressed sentiment: "If it
ain't broke, don't fix it." Persons of this conviction insisted that there there
should not be a wholly new code merely for the sake of novelty; they insisted that each provision that was to be changed had to be shown to be
lacking in some specific aspect. A second powerful voice came from judges
and lawyers who insisted that it was poor policy to discard a hundred years
of experience with and understanding of the existing law, and to cast away
the many judicial precedents which aided comprehension of that law. A
wholly new code would mean that Wyoming would have to start again from
scratch. Arguably these persons possessed some selfish interest in not
desiring to learn a whole new body of statutory law; and while their fund of
priceless precedents was in reality far smaller than they claimed, their conservative approach did serve to limit the number of changes that could
practicably be made. A third source was the unyielding fact that the task of
preparing an entirely new code simply was beyond the resources available.
The Wyoming Legislature does not have available an enormous staff of
legislative aides to research and draft legislation; and the personal energies
of the legislators who served selflessly on the interim committees were only
finite. The result was that in some areas where interest was not intense,
the Legislature made little change, but for the most part simply reenacted
the existing statutes. The effort required to undertake an exhaustive and
painstaking examination of these statutes was not present. The result is
that some old statutes which are obsolescent, if not obsolete, have been
retained.
One effect of a lack of reexamination of old statutes has been that
within the 1982 Criminal Code are several statutes which are of a civil
rather than criminal nature. These include arson reporting immunity;88
release of information by banks in check fraud cases;8 9 nuisances; 40
31. Ind. Code §§ 35-45-4-2 to -4 (1974); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-4-101 to -103 (Supp. 1983).
32. Wyo. STAT. § 6-6-102 (Supp. 1983).
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4101 (1981).
Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-304 (Supp. 1983).
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-205 (1973).
Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-5-101 to -307 (Supp. 1983).
Notes to Working Draft 3, Criminal Code of 1982, 5.1 (Sept. 1981).
Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-108 to -110 (Supp. 1983).
39. WYo. STAT. §§ 6-3-705, 6-3-706 (Supp. 1983).
40. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-6-201 to -209 (Supp. 1983).
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firearms regulation;" 1 and regulation of sale of rifles and shotguns.' 2 These
statutes would be more appropriately placed elsewhere.

IV. THE WYOMING CRIMINAL CODE OF 1982

Preliminary observations behind, it is our next task to consider the individual substantive provisions of the Code itself. The Criminal Code of
1982 is divided into ten chapters, containing thirty-five articles made up of
one hundred eighty-nine sections. There is something to be said as to every
one of these sections, but a commentary upon those dimensions would
prove beyond the scope of even a series of law review articles. Therefore
the observations will be limited to those sections which in the author's
opinion are the most significant. Th'e ten chapters of the Code will be addressed in the order in which they appear in the Code itself.
A. Chapter 1: General Principles
1. Applicability of Provisions
Section 6-1-101(a) gives the code a name: it "may be cited as the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982." The two succeeding subsections provide that
prosecutions for crime shall be governed by the law in effect when the
crime was committed, but that in prosecutions pending upon the effective
date of the Code, defendants should have the benefit of any reduced penalty
effected by the Code.' 8 Aside from initial flurries over the proper choice of
a court to process what was a felony when committed but is now to be
punished as misdemeanor, and over efforts by defendants to defer trials or
sentencing until after July 1, 1983, when it was in their interest to do so,
this section should cause no particular problems.
2. Common-law Crimes

The 1982 Criminal Code makes plain that only those acts which the
legislature has specifically proscribed are to be crimes in Wyoming; section
6-1-102 provides in part: "Common-law crimes are abolished. No conduct
constitutes a crime unless it is described as a crime in this act or in another
statute of the state." Thus the Legislature has definitively settled the question of whether prosecutors can charge, and courts can recognize, old
common-law crimes, whether or not they have been previously enforced, or
can devise new common-law crimes. They cannot.
While abolishing common-law crimes, the legislature has recognized
that many of Wyoming's statutory crimes are merely a codification of the
common law, and that the common law must be relied upon to provide
definition and meaning to the statutory language. Accordingly, section
6-1-102 further provides that the courts may use case law (common law)
"as an interpretive aid and in the construction of this act."
41. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-8-201 to -204 (Supp. 1983).
42. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-8-301 to -303 (Supp. 1983).
43. Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-101(b), (c) (Supp. 1983).
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3. Civil Recovery for CriminalAct
Section 6-1-103 reenacts a provision which has been present in Wyoming criminal statutes since 1890:44 the criminal code does not prevent persons injured by criminal acts from recovering damages, but the only
evidence of a conviction which may be used as evidence in a civil damage action is a conviction "obtained by confession in open court."
Efforts were made, particularly in the 1983 legislative session, to
broaden this provision to permit injured persons a wider use of evidence of
criminal conviction in civil actions for damages, but consensus failed and
the section remains in its original form.
Whatever may be the history of section 6-1-103 and the original rationale for its enactment, it is plainly antiquated and inconsistent with
modern legal development. Wyoming Rule of Evidence 803(22) specifically
provides that evidence of a final judgment of conviction, after a trial or a
plea of guilty, of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more
than one year, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, and may be admitted "to
prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment." While admittedly the
rule only removes the hearsay objection, and does not directly conflict with
section 6-1-103, the rule plainly shows that the modern trend is toward
freer introduction of evidence of criminal convictions in civil cases. 45
In an era in which the rights of criminal victims are being increasingly
recognized, there is no good reason to prohibit the use of a criminal conviction to aid the victim of the crime to recover damages for loss caused by the
crime. Concern over the use of convictions for minor crimes may be allayed
by permitting admission only of convictions of serious crime. Some of this
concern is misplaced, however, in light of the provision that a guilty plea
may be admitted in a subsequent civil damage action; it is the motor vehicle
misdemeanor which generates a high proportion of civil damage claims to
which a defendant is most likely to plead guilty without reflection upon the
civil consequences. Under section 6-1-103 such guilty pleas are admissible.
The section, if applied literally, is also overbroad, since it prohibits the
use of criminal convictions in damage actions for normal impeachment purposes, unless the conviction was upon a plea of guilty. This prohibition extends to any witness and to any crime, including those not connected with
the damage claim.
4. Definitions
One attribute of a code is that it employs carefully defined terms in a
consistent manner. Previous Wyoming criminal statutes used a variety of
terms in disorganized fashion, using different words to express the same
meaning, and sometimes the same words to express different meanings.
The Criminal Code of 1982 contains more definitions than earlier collections of Wyoming criminal statutes, but the problem of terminology is far
from solved. As set forth throughout this article, there has been a failure in
many cases to employ carefully defined terms in a consistent manner.
44. 1890 Wyo. SESS. LAWS ch. 73, § 9.
45. See C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 318 (2d ed. 1972).
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Within the Code, definitions are found in three principal locations: in
section 6-1-104, which is the general definition section; at the beginning of
some individual articles, as with sexual assault;46 and within sections
relating to individual crimes, as with robbery47 or defrauding an
innkeeper. 48 Many definitions are taken directly from the Model Penal
Code, while others show M.P.C. influence.
The process of defining words and terms is a difficult one, but since the
art of legislation is essentially the expression of precise meaning, it is a
necessary one. Definition which is too broad leaves to the judge or jury the
power to determine the reach of the law; but definition which is to narrow
may exclude reprehensible conduct from the application of criminal sanction. Wyoming Criminal Code definitions, following the lead of the Model
Penal Code, tend toward overbreadth, perhaps on the theory that it is
socially acceptable to criminalize a greater part of human conduct, and that
the court or jury will balk at overextension which transcends communal
norms.
Thus bodily injury, a term of importance in many crimes against persons, "means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical
condition." 49 The definition of deadly weapon is similarly broad, and embodies a teleological element: a deadly weapon is anything "which in the
manner it is used or is intended to be used is reasonably capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.' '50 Under this definition, if serious bodily
injury has been caused, then what caused it is pretty plainly a deadly
weapon.
5. Partiesto Crime
The prior statutory provision on accessories before the fact"' has been
retained essentially unchanged in section 6-1-201. The content of this section is unremarkable, providing that one who aids or abets in the commission of a felony, or who counsels, encourages, hires, commands or procures
a felony to be committed, may be prosecuted as a principal and punished as
a principal. The only unusual aspect is the retention of the anachronism
that one can only be an accessory before the fact to a felony. At common
law this did not create a hiatus as to misdemeanors, since "all persons concerned therein, if guilty at all, are principals." 52 A 1929 Wyoming decision 3 adopted the common law rule, which will probably survive the enactment of the 1982 Criminal Code. Nevertheless, any confusion could have
been obviated by a simple statutory change.
The provision on accessories after the fact has been placed in Chapter
5, under Offenses Against Public Administration, in section 6-5-202, upon
the theory that an accessory after the fact is not truly a party to the crime.
This provision is discussed at a later point in this article.
46. Wyo.
47. Wyo.
48. Wyo.
49. Wyo.
50. Wyo.
51. WYO.

§
STAT. §
STAT. §
STAT. §

6-2-301 (Supp. 1983).
6-2-401(d) (Supp. 1983).
6-3-406(b) (Supp. 1983).
6-1-104(a) (i) (Supp. 1983).
STAT. § 6-1-104(a) (iv) (Supp. 1983).
STAT. § 6-1-114 (1977). See Hawkes v. State, 626 P.2d 1041 (Wyo. 1981).
STAT.

52. 4 W. BLAcKsroNE,

COMMENTARIES

036.

53. State v. Weekley, 40 Wyo. 162, 275 P. 122 (1929).
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6. State of Mind: Culpability
Traditional criminality is based upon possession by the accused of a
culpable state of mind at the time he acted. Much confusion has been
engendered by legislative failure to specify the state of mind required to
convict of various crimes, or by the use of terminology of uncertain and
undefined meaning such as wantonly, maliciously, negligently, purposely,
willfully, intentionally, fraudulently, and unlawfully, in connection with the
criminal act. Often it has not been made clear what, if any, state of mind
must be present as to each of the elements of a particular crime.
Wyoming's criminal statutes have been, historically, generally no better
and no worse than those of other states, but some confusion has occurred.
One great contribution of the Model Penal Code has been the recognition that understanding of the criminal law is greatly enhanced if the required criminal states of mind are limited in number and carefully defined.
Model Penal Code section 2.02 sets forth and defines four states of mind:
purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. These terms are used
consistently throughout the Model Penal Code, and others are avoided.
Clear direction has thus been given to the lawyer or judge confronted with
the problem of ascertaining the mental elements of a particular criminal
offense.
When the Wyoming Criminal Code was drafted, some attempt was
made to employ the Model Penal Code terminology. This was not
thoroughly successful in the face of the expressed desire to retain the
historical elements of many crimes. A degree of success was achieved when
definitions of "recklessly ' 54 and "criminal negligence" 5 were included in
the Code, and when the statutory language was in several places modified
to employ these terms instead of vague possible synonyms.
The Model Penal Code term "knowingly" was used in a number of sections of the new Code, but no definition was provided. It remains to be seen
whether the Wyoming courts will apply the Model Penal Code definition to
the term. Although the M.P.C. definition is not an uncommon or improbable one, neither is it the only possible definition which might be used.
The 1982 Criminal Code employs a variety of other undefined terrequired state of mind, including: "believes," 56
minology to express the
"reasonably believing,"' 57 and "has reasonable cause to believe"; 58 "intentionally," 5 9 "knowingly or intentionally,' '6 "intentionally and
knowingly," 61 "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly, ' 62 and "intentional64
ly or in reckless disregard of the consequences"; 68 "involuntarily" ' and
54. Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-104(a) (ix) (Supp. 1983).
55. WYo. STAT. § 6-1-104(a) (iii) (Supp. 1983).
56. Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-403(a) (Supp. 1983).
57. Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-605(b) (Supp. 1983).
58. WYo. STAT. § 6-3-403(a) (Supp. 1983).
59. Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-401(c) (i) (Supp. 1983).
60. Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-101 (Supp. 1983).
61. WYO. STAT. § 6-2-504 (Supp. 1983).
62. Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-502(a) (i) (Supp. 1983).
63. Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-503 (Supp. 1983).
64. Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-105(a) (i) (Supp. 1983)
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"voluntarily"; 6 5 "knowing," 6 6 "knowingly,

know,"6 9

reasonably should
believe";70 "maliciously"
74
"purposely";

;71

' 67

1982
"knows, '"68 "knows or

and "with knowledge or probable cause to
"negligently";72
"premeditated malice";78
75

and "willfilly."1

One other problem is that in upwards of fifty sections of the new
Criminal Code there is no mental state specified for one or more elements
of the offense. While some of these elements are meant to embody strict
criminal liability, so that mental state is not a relevant factor, it is doubtful
whether all of these sections were intended to impose strict liability. When
the issue arises, as it is certain to do, the courts will be required to determine whether any mental state must be shown, and if so, what it is.
7. Defenses

While the 1982 Criminal Code provides expressly that common-law
crimes are abolished, it declares with equal force that "Common-law
defenses are retained unless otherwise provided by this act."'7 6 This provision has no predecessor in the Wyoming statutes. Although it is not difficult to understand the effect of a provision abolishing common-law
crimes, the retention of common-law defenses poses serious problems of
interpretation.
The first is the meaning of "common-law." Is the proper reference to
the common law of England, or to the common law of the United States, or
to the common law of Wyoming? If the reference is to the common law of
England, then it must be determined what is to be the applicable date at
which the common law is to be ascertained. Care must be taken in that case
to avoid a date so early that ancient defenses, long discarded, cannot be
asserted. Benefit of clergy comes to mind. It is likely that the proper construction will be to consider as falling within the common law only those
defenses which the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized prior to July 1,
1983, the effective date of the Criminal Code.
A second problem is whether new common-law defenses may be
recognized, or existing ones enlarged. If read literally, retention of
common-law defenses means only that those defenses already recognized
can be asserted in the future, and that the power to create any new
defenses rests solely with the Legislature. But it is by no means certain
that the Wyoming Supreme Court will find itself so limited.
65. WYo. STAT. § 6-2-201(c) (Supp. 1983).
66. Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-303(a) (Supp. 1983).

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Id,

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

§ 6-1-201 (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-3-408 (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-2-302(a) (ifi) (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-6-102 (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-2-104 (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-2-310(a) (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-2-101 (Supp. 1983).

75. Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-404(a) (Supp. 1983).

76. Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-102(b) (Supp. 1983).
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Clearly the Legislature could have listed statutorily all of the available
defenses. The Model Penal Code has done So. 77 While it might be argued
that the Legislature did not list defenses because it wished to leave room
for growth in the law through the process of judicial decision, with the
courts free to adopt new defenses as the need might arise, a more likely explanation is that the Legislature did not feel itself able, within constraints
of time and manpower, to set out criminal defenses in a definitive fashion.
Several provisions of the Criminal Code do relate to defenses, or to
matters whose existence negates the commission of a crime. Often it is not
entirely clear whether a specific provision is a defense, in the sense that it is
a fact which the defendant must prove, but if proved negatives the offense.
Some of the Code provisions which can be characterized as defenses include: being under the influence of alcohol or drugs; 78 renunciation of attempt, 79 or persuasion to abandon the crime after solicitation,80 or
withdrawal from and thwarting of conspiracy;81 voluntary release of kidnapping victim unharmed; 82 reasonable belief in sexual assault prosecutions that child was over sixteen years of age;8 s defense of person, property
or abode, or of another, to charge of threatening to use drawn deadly
86
85
weapon,8 4 or pointing firearm; affirmative defenses to criminal entry;
87
limitations upon obscenity statute; reasonable belief in bigamy prosecution that person is free to remarry; 88 action of public servant within scope
of authority as defense to requiring bidder or contractor to deal with particular supplier; 9 being a relative of a fugitive, in accessory after the fact
prosecution; 90 and being authorized to take a controlled substance, intoxicating liquor, or deadly weapon into a jail or other penal institution. 91 It is
not always clear from the statutory language whether the additional fact
must be proved by the accused, or disproved by the prosecution.
In one statute, a common law defense is not fully retained: the marital
exemption to sexual assault. The relevant language of section 6-2-307 is:
"The fact that the actor and victim are married to each other is not by itself
a defense .... Whether the circumscription placed upon the defense by
this language means that the defense has been abolished, or that it has been
abolished only to the extent stated, is uncertain; but if section 6-1-102(b) is
read in conjunction with section 6-2-307, it seems clear that the marital exemption remains, except to the extent limited by section 6-2-307.
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04; §§ 2.08 through 2.13; §§ 3.01 through 3.10; §§ 4.01 through
4.10 (P.O.D. 1962). Other specific affirmative defenses are spelled out in individual sec78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

tions on substantive crimes.
Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-202 (Supp. 1983).
Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-301(b) (Supp. 1983).
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
WYo.
WYo.
Wyo.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

STAT.
STAT.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

§ 6-1-302(b)

(Supp. 1983).

§ 6-1-303(b) (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-2-201(c) (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-2-308(a) (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-2-502 (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-2-504 (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-3-302 (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-4-302 (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-4-401(b) (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-5-105(c) (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-5-202 (Supp. 1983).
§§ 6-5-208, 6-5-209 (Supp. 1983).
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There are also statutory defenses to crimes which are found outside the
Criminal Code, the most notable being the defense of mental illness or deficiency, found in section 7-11-304.
One other defense found within the Criminal Code has been retained
from prior statutory law, although in a reworded form. Section 6-1-202 provides that self-induced intoxication is not a defense to crime, except that it
may be offered to negate a specific intent which is an element of the crime.
This is a restatement of former section 6-1-116, which provided that
drunkenness was not an excuse for crime, except "where a crime rests in
intention." Section 6-1-202(b) of the new Code defines self-induced intoxication.
8. Inchoate Offenses
In 1981 the Wyoming Legislature enacted criminal statutes on attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy. 92 Prior to 1981 there was a statute
covering conspiracy to commit a felony, 93 but no general attempt statute
and no general solicitation statute. The new attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy crimes were denominated "inchoate offenses," meaning that they
were committed in the course of preparing to commit some other crime.
The new statutes were strongly influenced by the language of the Model
Penal Code, 9 4 although some features were drawn from the statutes of
other states. 95 In particular, the penalty section for the three crimes followed the Model Penal Code, 96 making each of them punishable as severely as
the most serious offense that was the object of the particular attempt,
solicitation, or conspiracy, with the single limitation that an attempt,
solicitation, or conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree could only
be punishable by life imprisonment if the murder were not actually committed. This is in keeping with the Model Penal Code philosophy that it is
dangerousness to society which is to be punished, and not necessarily the
results achieved by the criminal act.
The 1982 Criminal Code reenacts the new attempt, solicitation, and
conspiracy statutes, together with the penalty section, as sections 6-1-301
through 6-1-304. Some relatively minor changes were effected. Brief mention should be made of the salient features of these offenses.
The attempt statute, section 6-1-301, adopts the test that an attempt is
committed when a substantial step toward commission of the crime has
been taken. The step taken must be "strongly corroborative of the firmness" of the intent to commit the crime, and it is not required that close
proximity to success be achieved. Section 6-1-301(aXii) removes the defense
of impossibility; that the attempted crime could not in reality have been
committed is of no relevance if, under the circumstances as the defendant
believed them to be, it would have been possible to commit the crime. Thus
if an attempt is made to pick an empty pocket, or the professor attempts to
steal what is in reality his own umbrella, the crime has been committed.
92. 1981 Wyo. SEss. LAws ch. 11, § 1.
93. Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-117 (1977).
94. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01, 5.02, 5.03 (P.O.D. 1962).
95. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-301 (1973); Mo. REV. STAT. § 564.011 (1979); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-101 to -103 (1983).
96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 (P.O.D. 1962).
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The attempt statute has a singular defense: that after taking the
substantial step with intent to commit the crime, the actor may escape
criminal liability if, before actually committing the crime, he voluntarily
and completely renounces his criminal intention and thereby avoids committing the crime.9 The renunciation permits the person to wipe the slate
clean. There may be difficulty in applying this defense. While little difficulty would be experienced in the case where the actor takes his gun and sets
out resolutely for the intended victim's house twenty miles away, but
changes his mind at the halfway point and goes back, it is plainly a much
harder case where the actor reaches intended victim's house, fires one shot
through the window which misses, and then renounces his criminal intention and fires no more shots. The one Wyoming Supreme Court decision
dealing with the defense makes it reasonably clear that the defense is not
likely to be judicially favored. 98
The solicitation statute, section 6-1-302, is limited to felonies. This
limitation probably stemmed from the fact that there can only be an accessory before the fact to a felony, and not to a misdemeanor, and it was
felt that solicitation should have a similar treatment. A person may be convicted of solicitation only if the solicited crime is neither attempted nor
committed. It is a defense if the actor, after soliciting another, persuades
the other not to commit the crime or in some other way prevents the commission of the crime solicited.
The conspiracy statute, section 6-1-303, is fairly straightforward.
Agreement is required, as is an overt act. It is a defense if, after entering
into the conspiracy, the actor withdraws and thwarts the conspiracy's success in a manner which evidences his voluntary and complete renunciation
of criminal intention. The statute does not provide guidance for conspiracy
cases in which all of defendant's coconspirators are incompetent or are acquitted; this is left to common law.
B. Chapter2: Offenses Against the Person
1. Homicide
a. Murder in the First Degree

Section 6-2-101 of the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982 defines and provides for the punishment of murder in the first degree. The new Code section is substantially similar to the prior Wyoming statute, except in two
respects. The prior -section, section 6-4-101, listed as the crimes which can
form the predicate for Wyoming's approximation of felony murder: "rape,
sexual assault, arson, robbery or burglary." New section 6-2-101 has
deleted rape as redundant (sexual assault is the new name for rape and sundry other acts) and has added three new predicate crimes, so that the list
.now reads: "any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting
arrest or kidnapping."
A further deletion from the prior statute is the language "or whoever
purposely and with premeditated malice kills any peace officer, corrections
employee or fireman acting in the line of duty." Inasmuch as the statute
97. Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-301(b) (Supp. 1983).
98. Haight v. State, 654 P.2d 1232 (Wyo. 1982).
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already provided that "[wihoever purposely and with premeditated malice
... kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first degree," the
reference to police officers, corrections employees and firemen was felt to
be surplusage.
The Wyoming first degree murder statute, as it now appears in section
6-2-101 of the new Code, includes three kinds of killings:
(1) purposely and with premeditated malice;
(2) in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any sexual
assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting arrest or
kidnapping; and
(3) by administering poison or causing the same to be done.
As to killing purposely and with premeditated malice, little needs to be
said. This is the classical and traditional Wyoming statutory first degree
murder language, and its meaning is fairly well settled.
The second category, which once might have been described as felony
murder, with a limited number of specified predicate felonies, can no longer
be described by that term, since some of the predicate acts are not felonies,
but misdemeanors. Sexual assault in the fouth degree is a misdemeanor, 99
as is arson in the fourth degree, 100 and resisting arrest as well. 1 1 Two
things have caused this result: new crimes which are not felonies have been
added to the list, and older crimes which were felonies when put on the list
have been redefined so that they may be misdemeanors. It is not at all
beyond question that an unintended killing in the perpetration of a misdemeanor ought to be treated as first degree murder and draw a life
sentence.
The third category, administering poison, is antiquated, but was probably included originally on the ground that the administration of poison
which results in death will almost invariably involve purposeful and
premeditated acts, and therefore the prosecution should not be required to
prove the elements of purpose and premeditation. But if purpose and
premeditation do exist in poisoning cases, then there is no good reason not
to require killings by poison to be treated under the category of killings
committed purposely and with premeditated malice; from proof of the administration of poison the finder of fact will readily infer the necessary purpose and malice.
b. Death Penalty
When a defendant has been convicted of murder in the first degree, a
separate sentencing hearing must be held to determine whether he shall be
sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. Section 6-2-102 reenacts,
substantially unchanged, the prior Wyoming statutory provisions. 102 These
§ 6-2-306 (Supp. 1983).
§ 6-3-104 (Supp. 1983).
101. Wyo. STAT. § 6-5-204(a) (Supp. 1983).
102. Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-102 (1977). One change in new section 6-2-102(h) (viii) appears to have
been an inadvertence. The former subsection listed as an aggravating circumstance,
99. Wyo.

STAT.

100. Wyo. STAT.
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provisions govern the sentencing hearing and the determination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating to the killing and to the
defendant's personal history and characteristics. They are modeled upon
the Florida statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in the 1976
decision in Proffitt v. Florida.l0
Section 6-2-103 reenacts the prior statute providing for mandatory
review by the Wyoming Supreme Court of sentences of death. 104
c. Second Degree Murder
Section 6-2-104 reenacts the prior second degree murder statute
without change. 105 The second degree murder statute, including the
punishment which may be imposed, has remained unchanged since it was
adopted by the Wyoming Legislature in 1890.106
d. Manslaughter
Section 6-2-105 of the new Code reenacts with two changes the former
manslaughter statute, section 6-4-107. Voluntary manslaughter remains as
before: unlawful killing of a human being without malice, voluntarily, upon
a sudden heat of passion. The elements of voluntary manslaughter, which
are those of murder reduced by provocation, have remained the same since
1890.107

Two changes have been made, however, in the involuntary
manslaughter section of the statute. One is merely formal, excluding from
the manslaughter statute those unlawful act killings which are included in
section 6-2-106, homicide by vehicle. The other change is substantive.
Former section 6-4-107 provided that a killing was manslaughter if done
"involuntarily, but... by any culpable neglect or criminal carelessness."
New section 6-2-105(aXii) provides in its place: "involuntarily, but . ..
recklessly." The change in language apparently has not wrought a change
in meaning. In construing the prior section, the Wyoming Supreme Court
has declared that "culpable neglect" and "criminal carelessness" mean the
same thing, and that they require more than negligence. 08 There must be
an act which amounts to recklessness. 10 9 "Recklessly" is now defined by
the new Code to mean "done with a conscious disregard of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct will result in the harm he is
accused of causing." 110 Thus the new language should not result in any
change in meaning.
"The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, county attorney, or former county attorney, during or because of the exercise of his official duty." Because Wyoming now
has district attorneys as well as county and prosecuting attorneys, the subsection was

enlarged to include district attorneys. But in so doing, the Legislature inadvertently

omitted present county and prosecuting attorneys from the list. The subsection now
reads in relevant part: "district attorney, former district attorney or former county and

prosecuting attorney."

103. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
104. Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-103 (1977).
105. Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-104 (1977).
106. 1890 Wyo. SaSS. LAws ch. 73, § 16.
107. 1890 WYO. SEss. LAws ch. 73,

§

17.

108. See, e.g., State v. Catellier, 63 Wyo. 123, 179 P.2d 203 (1947).
109. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 562 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1977).
110. Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-104(a) (ix) (Supp. 1983).
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e. Homicide by Vehicle
The vehicular homicide statute has been a source of difficulty for
Wyoming prosecutors, and has led to a series of Wyoming Supreme Court
decisions delineating between manslaughter on the one hand, and vehicular
homicide on the other."' The vehicular homicide statute in the new
Criminal Code, section 6-2-106, represents the Legislature's latest effort to
create a viable and meaningful vehicular homicide statute under which
sanctions may be imposed upon drivers who cause death by criminally
negligent vehicle operation, and upon those who cause death while driving
under the influence of intoxicants. Unfortunately, section 6-2-106 is
seriously flawed.
Subsection (a) creates the crime of homicide by vehicle, where the
death results from criminal negligence. Criminal negligence is defined in
section 6-1-104(aXiii) to mean: "a great or excessive deviation from that
standard of care which a reasonable, prudent person would exercise under
the same or similar circumstances to avoid a substantial and unjustifiable
risk of harm."
The language of subsection (a) of section 6-2-106 is somewhat convoluted. In all likelihood it will ultimately be held to mean that a person
whose criminally negligent operation of a vehicle causes the death of
another person is guilty of homicide by vehicle. This in spite of the fact that
the language unfortunately seems to say something else, since it does not
connect the cause of the death to the criminally negligent operation of the
vehicle. Literally read, this section would impose guilt for homicide by vehicle upon a person who is driving prudently, but whose negligence causes
the death of a child passenger who chokes on a hard candy.
It is noteworthy, if troubling, that section 6-2-106(a) applies not merely
to drivers of motor vehicles, but to the operators of all vehicles. Vehicles
are defined in section 6-1-104(aXxi) to mean "any device by which persons
or property may be moved, carried or transported over land, water or air."
Thus vehicle can mean anything from a pipeline to an escalator or elevator.
Section 6-2-106(b) creates the offense of aggravated vehicular
homicide, applying to persons operating motor vehicles under the influence
of intoxicants whose intoxication causes the death of another person. The
original version of the statute, section 31-5-1117,112 provided that if anyone
driving a vehicle while under the influence caused the death of another person, he would be guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide. This original section was attacked on the ground that since it did not require a causal connection between the intoxication and the death, it was unconstitutional on
due process grounds. Fearing the success of this attack, the Legislature added to the version in the new Code the language: "and the violation [driving
under the influence] is the proximate cause of the death."
Whether proof of a causal connection between the intoxication and the
death is a constitutional requirement is not at all clear. At least one state
111. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 586 P.2d 157 (Wyo. 1978); Bartlett v. State, 569 P.2d 1235
(Wyo. 1977); Thomas v. State, 562 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1977); State v. Cantrell, 64 Wyo. 132,
186 P.2d 539 (1947); State v. McComb, 33 Wyo. 346, 239 P. 526 (1925).
112. Wyo. STAT. § 31-5-1117 (Supp. 1982), repealed by the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982.
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court has held that it is not.118 On principle, there seems no good reason
why a state could not provide that if a motorist drives while drunk and kills
someone, he can be subjected to enhanced punishment even if the prosecution does not prove that the intoxication caused the death.
In its determination to make aggravated vehicular homicide safe from
constitutional assault, the Legislature overreacted by putting in too many
words. Section 6-2-106(b) imposes guilt on a person "if, while driving a
motor vehicle in violation of W.S.31-5-233 [driving under the influence], he
unlawfully causes the death of another person while driving a motor vehicle
and the violation is the proximate cause of the death." There is one too
many "while driving a motor vehicle"; the only sensible reading of the
subsection is that the victim must be another driver.
f A Serious Omission?
The new Criminal Code contains no provision relating to the killing of
an unborn child. Former section 6-4-507 provided imprisonment for up to
fourteen years for killing an unborn child by a willful assault and battery
upon a woman known to be pregnant. New section 6-2-502(aXiv) makes the
causing of bodily injury to a woman known to be pregnant aggravated
assault, but contains no reference to assault upon the unborn child. Conceding the reluctance of legislators to confront an issue so closely related to
the abortion/right to life controversy, nevertheless there is an important
social value in protection of the unborn child of a wanted pregnancy.
2. Kidnapping and Related Offenses
a. Kidnapping
The former Wyoming kidnapping statute, section 6-4-201, penalized
only kidnapping which was undertaken for ransom, reward or robbery. A
companion statute, section 6-4-202, punished child stealing. The new
Criminal Code in section 6-2-201 substantially broadens the offense of kidnapping by expanding the underlying purposes which will make a removal
or confinement of a person kidnapping. Removal or confinement with intent to hold for ransom or reward, or to use as a shield or hostage, or to
facilitate the commission of a felony, or to inflict bodily injury or terrorize,
now constitutes kidnapping. The penalty provision has been retained,
whereby if the victim is released substantially unharmed prior to the trial
the maximum punishment is twenty years' imprisonment, but if not released unharmed the maximum punishment is imprisonment for not less than
twenty years, or for life.
Apparently, the Legislature intended to incorporate the former child
stealing statute into the new kidnapping statute. To this end, the new
statute provides that a removal or confinement of a child under fourteen is
unlawful if without the consent of a parent, guardian or other responsible
custodian. However, to constitute kidnapping the unlawful confinement or
removal must be for the purposes set forth above, including holding for ransom, as a hostage, to facilitate commission of a felony, or to inflict bodily injury. The simplest case of child stealing is one where the child is taken not
for these purposes, but to have as a child and to raise. A taking for the pur113. Baker v. State, 377 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1979).
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pose of keeping as one's own child will not constitute kidnapping under the
new section 6-2-201.
b. Felonious Restraint
Section 6-2-202 of the new Criminal Code adopts the language of Model
Penal Code section 212.2, to create the crime of felonious restraint. This
section had no counterpart in prior Wyoming law. It denominates as
felonious restraint any knowing unlawful restraint which exposes another
to risk of serious bodily injury, or any knowing holding of another in involuntary servitude. Thus it is intended to deal with aggravated restraints
of liberty which are considered less serious than kidnapping. Unfortunately, the vagueness of the terminology will impair the usefulness of this section. As exposure to risk of serious bodily injury is an element of the crime,
the failure to state how substantial the risk must be poses an obstacle to application of the statute. If any quantum of risk will suffice, then the statute
is indistinguishable from false imprisonment, since persons at all times are
exposed to some risk of serious bodily injury, and any false imprisonment or
other restraint will invariably increase the amount of that risk somewhat.
Also the failure of the section to define involuntary servitude poses a problem, since forcible slavery at one end of the spectrum shades gradually into subtleties of economic constraint under which virtually all of us must
exist.
c. FalseImprisonment
Section 6-2-203 of the 1982 Criminal Code is derived from Model Penal
Code section 212.3. While the language differs from the prior Wyoming
statute on false imprisonment, there seems to be little change in
meaning. 114 The new section forbids the knowing and unlawful restraint of
another "so as to interfere substantially with his liberty." The central issue
will be a matter of degree, which the finder of fact must decide. The Wyoming language, "knowingly and unlawfully restrains," differs from that of
the Model Penal Code, "knowingly restrains another unlawfully." The difference, which may have resulted from mere legislative tinkering with
word order, may be significant. Under M.P.C. there must be knowledge
both of the restraint and of the fact that the restraint is unlawful; while
under the Wyoming section there must be knowledge of the restraint, and
the restraint must be unlawful, but there need not be knowledge by the accused that the restraint is unlawful.
d. Interference with Custody
Prior Wyoming statutes, sections 6-4-203 through 6-4-205, dealt with
cases where one parent, who had no right to custody of the child, took
physical custody in violation of court order or express agreement. Taking
the child with intent to cause a change in physical custody was a misdemeanor, 115 but taking and knowingly and intentionally concealing and harboring the child was a felony with a two year maximum sentence. 116 Any
third person who agreed for compensation to assist in taking or concealing
a child was guilty of felony and could be imprisoned for ten years. 1 7
114.
115.
116.
117.

Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

§ 6-4-606
§ 6-4-203
§ 6-4-204
§ 6-4-205

(1977).
(1977).
(1977).
(1977).
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Section 6-2-204 of the 1982 Criminal Code replaces the former sections
with a single section drawn from Model Penal Code section 212.4. Under
the new section, any person is guilty of interference with custody by taking
or enticing a child from lawful custody of another, without privilege to do
so. It is a defense that the action was necessary to avert an immediate
threat to the child's welfare, or that the child taken was fourteen years of
age or older and was taken without intent to commit a criminal offense and
at the instigation of the child. Punishment is a felony if the person who
takes the child is not "a parent or person in equivalent relation to the
child," or if the child is concealed from the lawful custodian. If the person
who takes the child is a parent or equivalent person, and there is no concealment, the offense is a misdemeanor.
3. Sexual Assault
The Wyoming Legislature enacted a modem sexual assault statute in
1977.118 By "modern" statute is meant one which includes assaults upon
both males and females; which includes both traditional heterosexual rape
and other forms of sexual acts including sexual contact; which
decriminalizes consensual sexual acts between adults; which enlarges upon
the kinds of coercive sexual acts considered criminal; which eliminates the
necessity for corroboration of the testimony of alleged victims; which
makes reasonable mistake of age a defense to sexual acts with certain
minors; which provides for medical examination of alleged victims of sexual
assault; which forbids public release of the names of alleged victims and of
accused persons prior to the filing of an indictment or information; and
which limits the reception at trial of evidence of the victim's prior sexual
conduct or reputation.
The 1982 Wyoming Criminal Code reenacts the 1977 sexual assault
statutes, with several significant changes:
(a) The definition of sexual intrusion has been expanded to include the
former definitions of both sexual intrusion and sexual penetration.' 1 9 Inasmuch as the terms sexual intrusion and sexual penetration always appeared together, and the consequences of both acts under similar circumstances were the same, the new definition is merely a simplification
and does not effect any substantive change.
(b) Sexual assault in the third degree and sexual assault in the fourth
degree have been transposed.120 Sexual contact not resulting in serious
bodily injury was formerly third degree sexual assault,12 1 punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years;122 while sexual intrusion upon a
child under sixteen (but over twelve) and at least four years younger than
the actor was fourth degree sexual assault,123 a misdemeanor.1 2' Sexual
contact is now fourth degree, and a misdemeanor,125 while sexual intrusion
1977 WYo. SEss. LAWS ch. 70, § 1.
Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-301(vii) (Supp. 1983).
6-2-304, 6-2-305 (Supp. 1983).
Wyo. STAT.
Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-304 (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-306 (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-305 (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-306 (1977).
125. Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-304 (Supp. 1988).

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

%6
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upon a child under sixteen has become third degree and a felony. 128 The
flip-flop evidently resulted from second thoughts by the Legislature as to
the relative seriousness of the two offenses. But there is a no reason why,
for purposes of classical penological balance or otherwise, there must be a
misdemeanor sexual assault in addition to the felonies. If both sexual intrusion upon a child under sixteen and sexual contact not involving serious
bodily injury are felt to be of sufficient gravity, then they should both be
felonies.
(c) The marital exception to sexual assault has been modified substantially. Formerly section 6-4-307 provided:
A person does not violate any provision of this act if the actor
and the victim are legally married, unless a decree of judicial
separation or restraining order has been granted.
New section 6-2-307 provides:
The fact that the actor and the victim are married to each other
is not by itself a defense to a violation of W.S. 6-2-302(aXi), (ii) or
(iii) or 6-2-303(aXi), (ii), (iii) or (vi).
The effect of the revision is not altogether clear. Instead of total abolition
of the marital defense, the Legislature has narrowed it, but has invited the
courts to determine the remaining scope of the defense. The language "not
by itself a defense" gives rise to the likelihood that marriage plus some
other fact is a defense. Thus, under the statute, if the actor and the victim
are married to each other but not living together, so that the marriage is a
mere naked legal relationship without domesticity and conjugality to clothe
it, the actor has no defense based upon marriage. But if the actor and the
victim are married and cohabitating, maintaining a domestic establishment
together, the statutory language leaves open the possibility that these
facts, taken together, may constitute a defense. It is by no means127certain
just what interpretation the courts will place upon this language.
(d) Section 6-2-309, dealing with medical examination of alleged vic.tims, has been enlarged by two subsections. New subsection (e) provides
that if a minor's parents cannot be located, the minor may consent to the
examination, and subsection (f) now provides that a medical examination is
not mandatory if a report of sexual assault is received more than ten days
after the alleged incident. In addition, subsection (a) has been amended to
make explicit that the alleged victim may refuse a medical examination.
(e) Section 6-2-310, regulating the release of names of alleged victims
and accused actors, has been enlarged, and misdemeanor penal sanctions
have been authorized against persons who improperly release information.
An anomaly appears from the language used, which first provides that
names and information shall not "be released or negligently allowed to be
released," and then provides punishment for wifUid violation of the section. New authority is granted in subsection (b) to restrict disclosure of the
126. Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-305 (Supp. 1983).

127. Quaere: What is the effect of Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-102(b) (Supp. 1983)?
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identity of a minor alleged victim even after filing of an indictment or
information.
(f)
Former section 6-4-314 on attempted sexual assault in the first or second degree, which imposed a maximum five year sentence, has been
repealed. Attempted sexual assaults can be punished under the general attempt statute, section 6-1-301, and persons convicted may
receive punish12
ment equal to that provided for the completed offense.
4. Robbery and Blackmail
a. Robbery
Previous Wyoming robbery statutes were fairly straightforward expressions of the common law. Robbery was a forcible and felonious taking
"from the person of another any article of value, by violence or by putting
in fear." 129 If a firearm or other deadly weapon was used or exhibited, the
crime was aggravated robbery.180
Section 6-2-401 of the new Code embodies both robbery and aggravated
robbery, and has both broadened and narrowed the common law definition.
The broadening may spill over into the area of extortion,131 but the narrowing may have unintended consequences which eliminate from the new
crime of robbery many occurrences that formerly fell within the statute,
and which common sentiment would hold should still be regarded as robbery. Further, the narrowing may restrict the applicability of aggravated
robbery.
Section 6-2-401 broadens the common law in two respects. First robbery may now occur if, in the course of larceny, which now includes
embezzlement and larceny by bailee,18 2 bodily injury is inflicted or immediate bodily injury is threatened. Thus if in fleeing from a larceny the
thief injures another, or threatens injury, he commits robbery. If he uses or
displays a weapon in the process, he commits aggravated robbery. Plainly
none of these acts constituted robbery at common law, since common law
robbery required a taking from the person.18 Acts of a similar kind during
an attempt to commit larceny would likewise constitute robbery under the
new law. Second, it is now robbery if threats are brought to bear upon a
person apart from the location of the property which is the subject of the
larcenous intent.
But the section also narrows the common law by excluding from the
definition of robbery those not uncommon strong-arm takings of property
from the person which neither threaten nor inflict bodily injury. Thus under
the new law, if a woman with a purse containing $1500.00 in cash were
walking down the street and a purse-snatcher engaged her in a tug-of-war
for the purse and was ultimately successful without inflicting injury or
threatening bodily injury, the resulting crime would only be larceny.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-304 (Supp. 1983).
Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-401 (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-402 (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-401 (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 6-3-402(b), (d) (Supp. 1983).
R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CrIMINAL LAW 343 (3d ed. 1982).
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Moreover, in the example given, it would only be misdemeanor larceny, inasmuch as the amount involved is under $2000.00.134 Furthermore, if the
thief exhibited a deadly weapon this would still not be robbery, much less
aggravated robbery, unless bodily injury were inflicted or threatened. It is
to be urged that the section be amended to bring strong-arm larceny back
within the fold of robbery.
A further change relates to the language "threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury." This is Model
Penal Code language, taken from section 222.1(1)(b). Under common law
robbery, threats alone are of no effect unless they actually put the victim in
fear; 5 the new statute makes ineffectual threats or even unheeded threats
sufficient to form the basis for robbery. Perhaps this is a simple matter of
taking the would-be robber at his word; but it does reflect a shift from
result-oriented fear in the victim to the subjective intent-oriented purpose
of the would-be robber.
Under the common law, exemplified by Wyoming's prior statutes, robbery related to taking "any article of value,"13 6 which appeared limited to
tangible things. Under the new Code's definition of property, which is the
subject of larceny, there is included "anything of value whether tangible or
intangible, real or personal, public or private." If this definition is given full
effect, services can now become the subject of robbery. This may evidence
an inconsistency in the Code, since on the one hand any robbery is a felony,
no matter the value of the property taken, while under the statute dealing
with theft of services, the taking of services by threat may be either a
whether the services apmisdemeanor or a felony, depending 18upon
7
propriated are worth $2000.00 or more.
b. Blackmail
Blackmail is another crime which has been "modernized" by the 1982
Wyoming Criminal Code, although not without considerable enlargement
of its elements and the accompanying possibility of accomplishing some
unintended and unexpected results. Wyoming's earlier blackmail statutes
originated with an act approved December 10, 1869, forbidding extortionate threats to accuse others of crime.188 In 1890 a blackmail statute incorporating threats of injury to person or property as well as of accusation
was enacted, l3 9 and this cataloging of threatened harms remained the law
until the effective date of the 1982 Code.
The new blackmail statute is an attempt to simplify the former law, and
in so doing it draws upon and mingles Model Penal Code provisions. M.P.C.
section 223.4 deals with theft by extortion and includes threats which are
more explicitly described than Wyoming's new section 6-2-402; but the
Wyoming statute goes beyond threats to obtain property, and includes
threats intended "to compel action or inaction by any person against his
134. WYo. STAT. § 6-3-402 (Supp. 1983).
135. R. PERKIs & R. BoycE, supra note 133, at 348.

136. Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-401 (1977). Aggravated robbery used the language "any property of
value." But of. § 6-1-101(a) (i) (1977).
137. Wyo. STAT. § 63-408 (Supp. 1983).
138. 1876 Wyo. CoMP. LAws ch. 35, tit. 5, § 41.
139. 1890 WYo. SESS. LAws ch. 73, § 34.
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will." This additional language may implicate Model Penal Code section
212.5, Criminal Coercion, but the additional language may go beyond and
extend to such unintended things as false imprisonment by threat.
Three salient features of the Wyoming statute bear note. First, the
Model Penal Code sections expressly provide that it is an affirmative
defense to theft by extortion 140 or to criminal coercion 41 that the property
obtained or the action demanded was justified or honestly claimed. Wyoming section 6-2-402 is silent as to any possible justifications. Therefore
under the Wyoming statute persons making honest claims may unwittingly
commit blackmail. One example is the attorney in a divorce action who
urges upon his adversary a custody arrangement favorable to the
attorney's client, "so we don't have to go court and air your client's dirty
linen"-meaning a propensity to sexual acts with young boys. 142 A second
is the householder who returns home to find his flower garden ravaged, and
who is informed that the neighbor's teen-age boys were observed trampling
the tulips. For him to suggest to the neighbor that if recompense is made
"it won't be necessary to bring this to the attention of the police," is
blackmail under the new Code. Unless the Legislature intends as the public
policy of Wyoming that all disputes be fully litigated or that all petty complaints be made to the authorities rather than settled between the parties,
it would be well to add a provision that claims reasonably made in a good
faith effort to effect settlements of disputes are not blackmail.
A second feature of the Wyoming statute is that blackmail is invariably
a felony, no matter how small the property or action or inaction that is
sought. This should be contrasted with section 6-3-408, theft of services,
where theft of services by threat is graded according to the value of the services appropriated. Further, it should be noted that false imprisonment by
force is but a misdemeanor,1 4 while the same imprisonment caused by
threat (compelled inaction interfering substantially with liberty) can be
blackmail and thereby a felony.
A third feature is the newly incorporated concept of aggravated
blackmail, whereby if in the course of committing blackmail the accused injures another person the punishment is increased to a minimum of five
years and maximum of twenty-five years imprisonment. This seems to have
been some legislator's "good thing" gone amuck. Blackmail is a crime not
involving violence; if intentional violence occurs, the some other crime is
committed. But Wyoming's new aggravated blackmail provision imposes
what appears to be a strict liability element, causing injury to another person, upon the corpus of the crime of blackmail. There is no indication in the
statute as to the strength of the causal connection between those activities
related to the blackmail and the personal injury. Conceivably the injury
may be inflicted under circumstances which have only slight connection
with the purpose of the blackmail, as where the blackmailer negligently collides with another vehicle while driving to mail his latest demand. And
since blackmail is among the more protracted of crimes, any blackmailer
will likely remain at risk for a long time.
140. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (P.O.D. 1962).
141. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.50) (P.O.D. 1962).
142. Compare State v. Harrington, 128 Vt. 242, 260 A.2d 692 (1969).
143. Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-203 (Supp. 1983).
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5. Assault andBattery
a. Simple Assault; Battery
Wyoming has traditionally defined simple assault narrowly, restricting
it to attempts to cause violent injury to another, with present ability to do
s144 Likewise, the penalty has been low: the prior statute imposed as maximum punishment a $50.00 fine.'" Battery has been
146defined as a touching
of another in "a rude, insolent or angry manner."
The 1982 Criminal Code retains the traditional content of these crimes.
Section 6-2-501 provides that simple assault is committed when a person
"having the present ability to do so... unlawfully attempts to cause bodily
injury to another." Punishment is by fine alone, with a maximum of
$750.00. Battery has been extended to include both the rude, insolent or
angry touching and "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly" causing bodily
injury to another. Punishment for battery is a maximum six months' imprisonment and $750.00 fine.
Thus in Wyoming, assault by putting another in fear of imminent
touching or bodily injury remains non-criminal. Also, it may be questioned
whether the Legislature has not chosen to treat simple assaults too lightly;
persons with a propensity for inflicting violence may best be deterred by
the threat of a jail sentence. The Model Penal Code makes imprisonment a
possible penalty for simple assault, 147 expressly providing in its sentencing
of the
section that a fine alone shall be imposed by the court only when it is
148
opinion that "the fine alone suffices for protection of the public."
The new battery provision, under which bodily injury attributable to
recklessness will suffice for conviction, means that a person may be guilty
of battery without intending to cause bodily injury or even to touch the vicand unjustifiable risk
tim, if the person consciously disregards a substantial
49
that bodily injury will result from his conduct.
b. AggravatedAssault and Battery
Aggravated assault and battery, section 6-2-502, is derived from
earlier Wyoming statutes, including aggravated assault and batseveral
tery,150 and mayhem.' 1 The section broadens the scope of what may constitute an aggravated assault, and also seeks to serve as a substitute for the
former statute on killing an unborn child by assault and battery upon the
mother.
Aggravated assault and battery may be committed in four ways:
(1)Causing serious bodily injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
"under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
144. Wyo. STAT. § 64-501 (1977).
145. Id.
146. Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-502 (1977).
147. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 211.10); 6.08, 6.09 (P.O.D. 1962).
148. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.02 (P.O.D. 1962).
149. See definition of "recldessly" in Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-104(a) (ix) (Supp. 1983).
150. Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-506 (1977).
151. Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-601 (1977).
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human life." The language is derived from Model Penal Code section
211.1(2Xa). The terms "intentionally" and "knowingly" are not defined in
the Wyoming statutes, but presumably they should be given the same
meaning as in the Model Penal Code.
(2) Attempting to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causing, bodily
injury to another with a deadly weapon. This is again Model Penal Code
language, from section 211.1(2)(b). Attempting to cause this injury is included within the Model Penal Code as well as in the Wyoming statute, but
need not be included in either, inasmuch as attempts are punishable under
both codes as seriously as are completed crimes. 152 However, under the
Model Penal Code, an assault of this kind is punished less severely than the
infliction of bodily injury with extreme indifference to human life. 16 3 Under
Wyoming section 6-2-502, all included acts are punishable similarly, with a
maximum of ten years' imprisonment (but without provision for a fine, interestingly enough).
(3) Threatening to use a drawn deadly weapon unless "reasonably
necessary in defense of [one's] person, property or abode or to prevent
serious bodily injury to another." This provision, which describes neither
an assault nor a battery, may be misconceived. Its Wyoming antecedents
are a misdemeanor statute carrying a maximum penalty of six months' imprisonment and a $100.00 fine,1 4 and a felony statute dealing with a
malicious assault with a deadly weapon. 15 5 Nothing in these statutes would
appear to justify a new statute bearing punishment of a maximum of ten
years in prison. Furthermore, the defense of self, property or others provision seems to narrow the prior law by permitting defense of another by a
threat only when necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to that other.
Plainly, it is well established, particularly with regard to members of one's
own family, that one's right to defend others is equal to one's right to defend oneself. 156
(4) Causing bodily injury to a woman whom the person knows is pregnant. On its face, this subsection is objectionable, since it appears to impose
strict criminal liability; there is no state of mind required of the defendant
in the infliction of the bodily injury. Inasmuch as states of mind are carefully spelled out in the other subsections, the absence of any state of mind here
gives strong reason to conclude that none was intended. But a construction
of this kind would be an anomaly; a man whose operation of an automobile
caused injury to his wife, known to him to be pregnant, would become a
felon. Even inadvertent injury would impose a criminal liability, so long as
the actor knew the woman to be pregnant. This subsection is said to be a
substitute for prior section 6-4-507, which made felonious a killing of an unborn child by an assault upon a woman known to be pregnant. But while in
most cases the death of the unborn child could not result without bodily injury or serious bodily injury to the mother, and therefore the purpose as
stated would be served, the section may also result in considerable overkill
152. WYO. STAT. §§ 6-1-301, 6-1-304 (Supp. 1983); MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01, 5.05 (P.O.D.
1962).
153. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2) (P.O.D. 1962).
154. Wyo. STAT. § 6-11-102 (1977).
155. WYO. STAT. § 6-4-506 (1977).
156. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOWt, CsmINAL LAw § 54 (1972).
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even if some intentional or knowing mental element were read into the provision. For "bodily injury" may include relatively mild injuries to the
woman, which in no way endanger the child within her womb; bodily injury
"means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition."' 67
This would seem to include momentary pain, as well as any bruising or
discoloration. One can possess concern and empathy for pregnant women
without insisting that anyone who causes them momentary pain or slight
bruising should be made a felon, with potential punishment extending to
ten years in prison. It is strongly urged that this subsection needs
clarification.
c. Child Abuse
Section 6-2-503 reenacts with minor changes a child abuse statute first
enacted in 1977.11s The section, which is almost a model of bad drafting, imposes imprisonment for up to five years upon any adult who intentionally or
recklessly causes a child under sixteen years to suffer physical injury or
mental trauma, or to suffer assault and battery, "to a degree as to require
or psychiatric treatment to heal or overcome the inmedical,
juries
or psychological
damages. 1' 59 The section expressly excepts instances of violation
of the aggravated assault and battery section, section 6-2-502, which may
be more serious and bear a heavier potential penalty. Much of the section's
language wears a heavy veil of vagueness. By the term "mental trauma"
just what did the Legislature intend? Conceivably this term embraces common kinds of psychological abuse. But also it might include any act of a
reckless or intentional nature that might have traumatic consequences
upon the child's psyche. At an extreme, a reckless killing of a child's pet
could have such consequences as would justify psychiatric treatment. Nor
is it readily apparent why the offense may only be committed by adults;
Qlder children who are not yet adults but are serving as babysitters or even
as companions are often known to inflict trauma upon their charges.
d. Reckless Endangering
The statute on reckless endangering, section 6-2-504, is new to Wyoming, and is drawn from Model Penal Code section 211.2. The section is intended to penalize as misdemeanors those acts which may fall short of intentional endangerment, but which involve a conscious risk that another
will thereby be placed in danger of death or serious bodily injury. The
Wyoming statute departs from the Model Penal Code formulation in that
under section 6-2-504 the victim must actually be placed in danger, while
M.P.C. section 211.2 specifies "conduct which places or may place another
person in danger." The distinction may be seen to be of importance in a
case in which the defendant drives at a high rate of speed, on the wrong
side of the road, over the blind crest of a hill. Under the Model Penal Code,
it is not necessary that there be approaching traffic which is actually endangered for reckless endangering to occur; that approaching traffic may
be Ere is enough. But under the Wyoming statute, it is essential that oncoming traffic be present and actually be endangered. 16°
157. WYo. STAT. § 6-1-104(a) (i) (Supp. 1983).
158. 1977 WYo. SESS. LAws ch. 99, § 1.

159. At least the reading given in the text is one possible interpretation of the statute.
Another interpretation would be to impose liability for anyphysical injury or mental
trauma, intentionally or recklessly inflicted; as well as liability for any assault and battery
necessitating medical, psychological or psychiatric treatment.
160. See Williams, The Problem of Reckless Attempts, 1983 CRt,. L. REv. 365.
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The second subsection of section 6-2-504 provides that pointing a
firearm, apparently whether loaded or unloaded, at or in the direction of
another person is reckless endangering, unless the pointing is reasonably
necessary in self defense, in defense of one's property, or in defense of
another from serious bodily injury. It is curious that the defense of others is
qualified by the threat of serious bodily injury, while defense of self is not;
this distinction appears to be a limitation which regresses even beyond
early law, since a man has historically been generally privileged to use the
same force to protect others, including members of his family, as he can use
to protect himself.16' The provision making it reckless endangering to point
62
a firearm makes absolute what the Model Penal Code only presumes;
to avoid any potential proevidently the Wyoming Legislature has chosen
168
blems with presumptions in criminal cases.
e. TerroristicThreats
Section 6-2-505, which prohibits terroristic threats, is new to Wyoming, and is taken almost verbatim from section 211.3 of the Model Penal
Code. The M.P.C. provision, however, includes threats of violence both to
terrorize individuals and to cause public inconvenience, whether through
evacuation of buildings, places of assembly, transportation facilities or
otherwise. The Wyoming statute does not include terroristic threats
directed solely against individuals. It should be noted that the section deals
both with threats which are intended to cause inconvenience and threats
which are made in reckless disregard of the risk of causing inconvenience.
Therefore no matter what the person making the threat may intend, he
of "a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that inmay be guilty if he is aware
16 4
convenience will result.
[Editor's note: The second half of Dean Lauer's article will appear in
Volume XIX, No. 2.]

161. See W.LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, supra note 156; R. PERKIN' & R. BOYCE, supra note 133, at
1144.
162. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (P.0.D. 1962), provides in part: "Recldessness and danger
shall be presumed where a person knowingiy points a firearm at or in the direction of
another, whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be loaded."
163. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
164. Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-104(s) (ix)(Supp. 1983).
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